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CAN EMPLOYERS PUT GENETIC INFORMATION
TO GOOD USE?
KATHLEEN C. ENGEL1
I. INTRODUCTION
In my talk today I am going to try to answer the question: Can employers put
genetic information to good use? Preparing this talk was a challenge because it
required me to switch sides of the table. Having represented plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases for ten years, my inclination is to focus on the
ways that employers can use genetic information to the detriment of their workers. I
chose to talk about the value of genetic information from the employers’ perspective
because I wanted to force myself to engage in a disciplined study of the issues, rather
than simply don the hat of an employee advocate.
Many employee advocates argue that employers should never have any access to
their employees’ genetic information. What I want to do today is identify situations
in which employers could use employees’ genetic information to benefit themselves
and their employees. In giving these examples, I am not advocating that employers
have unlimited access to employees’ genetic information. Rather, I am suggesting
that with adequate controls there is the potential for employers to utilize employees’
genetic information in ways that are socially valuable.
For the purposes of this talk, I am focusing on employees whose genetic
propensities for certain diseases are not yet expressed, understanding, of course,
what Dr. Zahka said earlier, that this can be a hard line to draw. There are two ways
to think about using genetic information in the employment context. One is to look
at an individual employee’s genetic information, and the other is to focus on the
genetic traits represented by a pool of employees.2
II. ACCESS TO INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE’S GENETIC INFORMATION
I will turn first to genetic information about individual employees. Employers
could use genetic information to identify “costly” employees, i.e. those employees
whose genome indicates that they could develop diseases that could lead to increased
health insurance costs, absenteeism, disability claims, and workers’ compensation
claims.3 Clearly, without the threat of sanctions, many employers will use this
information to refuse to hire or to terminate employees who are likely to become
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expensive in these ways. I think we can agree that no good comes from this sort of
genetic discrimination.
When, in this talk, I highlight ways that employers could put genetic information
to good use, I am not advocating for these discriminatory employment practices.
Indeed, we should not even consider endorsing “good” uses for genetic information
until effective protections against genetic discrimination are in place.
A. Identifying Employees Who are Susceptible to Developing Specific Diseases
Employers could use employees’ genetic information to provide preventative
medical care. For example, if a genetic test revealed that an employee was at risk for
developing diabetes, an employer could refer the employee to an employee
assistance plan that could recommend preventative measures that might actually
decrease the odds of the employee developing diabetes.4 Several years ago, Wells
Fargo implemented a twenty-four hour disease management program for its
employees with diabetes.5 Although the Wells Fargo employees were already
symptomatic, there is no reason why similar programs could not be implemented
proactively with the goal of reducing the expression of genetic diseases.
The potential benefits of proactive programs are obvious. Employers could
experience a reduction in their health and disability insurance claims, lower
absenteeism and turnover, increased worker productivity, and better returns on any
investments they make in training employees. It is also possible that insurance
companies would discount insurance premiums for employers who implemented
these types of programs. From the employees’ perspective, employer-sponsored
medical assistance programs could improve their overall well-being and, in some
cases, prolong their lives. Society would benefit as well. Whenever we can reduce
the likelihood that diseases will develop, we generate savings for the social welfare
system. Lastly, to the extent that employees would depend on family members or
friends for care taking if they became ill, testing and early interventions could relieve
the potential burden on caretakers.
B. Identifying Employees Who are Particularly Vulnerable to Workplace Hazards
If employers were able to identify employees with genetic traits that make them
unusually susceptible to developing diseases if exposed to workplace toxins or if
engaged in specific activities, employers could make job assignments that would
reduce these employees’ exposure to the suspect toxins or activities.6 For example,
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as Commissioner Miller mentioned yesterday, there is evidence that some people
may have a genetic predisposition to developing beryllium disease.7 Beryllium is a
metal that is used in the manufacture of a wide range of products, from fluorescent
lights to automobile circuit boards. Genetic testing for the propensity to develop
beryllium disease would enable employers to place vulnerable employees in
positions where they would not be exposed to beryllium.
Arguably, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)8 and the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA)9 already require this type of intervention to protect
employees from workplace hazards. Under the ADA, employers are required to
make reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities.10 If genetic
predispositions constitute “disabilities” under the ADA, employers may have an
obligation to insulate workers, who because of their genetic makeup, are susceptible
to developing certain diseases if exposed to workplace toxins or hazards. Likewise,
an OSHA requirement that employers eliminate significant workplace hazards
arguably includes the requirement to test employees to determine whether they are
unusually vulnerable to workplace toxins.11
C. Genetic Monitoring of Employees Who are Exposed to Workplace Hazards
Genetic monitoring of employees who are exposed to workplace hazards could
also be beneficial. For example, monitoring the genetic makeup of employees could
permit employers to establish if and when employees exceed acceptable levels of
exposure.12 Similarly, genetic monitoring could enable employers to identify
workplace hazards that have not yet been identified as toxic. For example, if
7
At least one company, Brush Wellman, is providing employees with the option of having
third parties test them for genetic traits that could increase the employees’ risk of developing
diseases if exposed to workplace toxins. See generally, T. Shawn Taylor, Mapping of Human
Genome Could Make Way for Genetic Testing by Employees, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 2001. The
employer pays for the tests, but only the third party testers and the employees know the
results. Id.
I somewhat cynically believe that when employers offer this test, they are motivated in
part by the possibility that the testing could help them defend any future tort claims brought by
workers who elected not to take the test or by workers who tested positively for the genetic
traits and continued to work in positions that entailed exposure to the particular toxins. This
situation bears some similarity to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson
Controls. Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). Johnson
Controls excluded pregnant and fertile women from working with lead, in part, because it
wanted to insulate itself from tort claims that might arise if women who worked with lead had
children with lead-related disabilities. Id. at 191-92. The Supreme Court required Johnson
Controls to give women the choice whether to work with lead. Id. at 211. In the process, the
Court likely provided the company with a strong defense to future tort claims based on injuries
arising from fetal exposure to lead.
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employees underwent regular genetic testing and the testing revealed unexplained
changes in the employees’ genetic makeup, this information could be helpful in
identifying toxins in the workplace.
D. Access to Genetic Information for Use in Health Emergencies
Genetic information could also be valuable when an employee becomes seriously
ill on the job. If an employer knew that a particular employee had a genetic
susceptibility to a given disease and then the employee exhibited symptoms
consistent with that disease, the employer’s knowledge could be helpful in an
emergency situation. For example, if an employer knew that an employee carried a
gene that made her susceptible to developing diabetes and the employee passed out
on the factory floor, the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s genetic propensity
for diabetes could be valuable to emergency and other medical personnel.
III. POOLED GENETIC INFORMATION
A. Identifying Diseases That a Significant Number of Employees are Susceptible to
Developing
Many of the concerns about genetic discrimination disappear if employees’
genetic information is pooled, i.e., when employers do not know the genetic traits of
any individual employee, but instead have an overall genetic profile of their workers.
There are a number of ways that pooled information could be valuable. If employers
knew, for example, that a significant number of their employees were susceptible to
developing heart disease, they could put educational programs in place, have a
nutritionist speak to employees about diet, or subsidize employees’ memberships to
health clubs, all of which would have the same benefits as interventions based on
individual level information without the accompanying risk of discrimination.13 The
downside for employers of using pooled information is that, without knowing the
specific individuals at risk, they would have to extend the benefits to all employees,
not just those truly at risk. Thus, interventions based on pooled information would
not be as cost effective as individualized interventions. On the other hand,
promoting the overall health of all employees could be cost effective if it reduced
absenteeism and healthcare costs.
B. Using Pooled Information to Reduce Insurance Costs
Pooled information could be particularly valuable when it comes to insurance.
Insurance is a system of cross-subsidies: healthy insureds subsidize less healthy
insureds.14 If all employers pay the same rate for insurance regardless of the health
risks presented by their employees, there can be an adverse selection problem. For
employers whose employees have an increased likelihood of becoming ill, the
marginal benefit of insurance exceeds the marginal cost. Conversely, for employers
13

Of course, if the pooled risk was high enough, employers could fire all their employees
and hope that the next pool of employees presented a reduced genetic risk.
14

Naomi Obinata, Genetic Screening and Insurance: Too Valuable an Underwriting Tool
to Be Banned from the System, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 145, 146
(1992).
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whose employees have a relatively low risk of becoming seriously ill, the marginal
cost of insurance often exceeds the marginal benefit. In response to this
phenomenon, employers with relatively healthy employees may elect to not provide
health insurance coverage at all, and instead increase employees’ wages with
resources that would otherwise be spent on health insurance. Insurance companies,
left with the less healthy workers, will in turn raise premiums to cover the cost of
insuring the most risky people. A second adverse selection problem arises if some
employers provide health insurance coverage and others do not: Workers who are ill
or likely to become ill will flock to the employers who offer health insurance. 15
One way to eliminate or reduce this adverse selection problem would be to
establish a risk-based pricing program, where employers’ insurance premiums would
be based on the pooled risk presented by their cluster of employees. Risk-based
pricing is well established in the life and automobile insurance industries. When you
are older, you pay more for life insurance because you are more likely to die. In
most states, young males pay a premium for automobile insurance because
collectively they present a greater risk of causing an accident than their female
counterparts.
The more accurately insurance companies assess risk, the more efficiently they
can price policies and pass any savings on to customers.16 Genetic information has
the potential to be a valuable tool for engaging in more accurate risk assessment and
risk-based pricing. For example, if insurance companies reviewed the genetic profile
of each employer’s employees, they could then set prices based on the relative risk
presented by each group of workers. Employers whose employees had a relatively
low pooled risk would pay less for their insurance.17 If employers were paying
premiums based on the actual risk posed by their employees, the incentive for
employers to elect not to provide health insurance on efficiency grounds is reduced.
The downside of risk-based pricing is the less affluent tend to be less healthy, and
poor health can trigger expression of genetic diseases. Thus, charging on the basis of
risk could create situations where those with the least assets pay the most for
insurance.18 In addition, employers whose employees present a relatively high level
of risk may opt to not provide any health insurance because of the cost.
15
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Other options include pricing insurance based on experience or community rating. The
problem with experience ratings is that they create an incentive for employers to deny
employees health care, for example, by making the claims and approval processes
cumbersome.
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wondering whether they are going to develop potentially life-threatening diseases.
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One solution to this problem would be to establish a discounting program in
which employers who implement preventative health care programs in response to
genetic information about their employees would receive a discount on their
insurance premiums.19 This has the potential to reduce some of the cost differential
between the high-risk and low-risk groups.20 I am not aware of anyone who has
tested or modeled this idea and suspect that even the best of preventative health care
programs will not sufficiently eliminate the cost difference. Another option would
be for the federal government to play a role, either by picking up the premium cost
differential for employers whose employees present high risk levels or by
establishing federally-sponsored high-risk pools that would provide health insurance
coverage for workers at risk of developing serious diseases.
IV. CONCLUSION
This exercise in switching sides of the table has made me realize that it is
premature to endorse an all-out prohibition on employers’ access to any form of
genetic information about their employees. I say this for two reasons. First, with
adequate safeguards, employers could use genetic information in ways that would
benefit employees, employers, and society. Second, genetic testing is in its
infancy.21 At this point, employers are not engaging in widespread genetic testing
and discrimination so there is no immediate need to impose a ban to protect workers.
During this period of learning and experimenting, there is an opportunity for us to
craft a solution to the problem of genetic discrimination before it comes a reality.
And, in so doing, I suggest that we keep in mind the possibility that employers could
use genetic information for socially productive purposes.

19
Auto insurance companies and health insurance companies offer rate reductions on an
individualized basis, e.g., reduced rates for drivers whose cars have airbags, and health
insurance rate reductions for non-smokers. Obinata, supra note 14, at 60.
20

Of course, the cost differential might persist if the insurer offered the same rate
discounting program to employers whose employees were not high risk.
21

See T.H. Cushing, Should There Be Genetic Testing in Insurance Risk Classification?,
60 DEF. COUNS. J. 249, 252 (1993) (discussing the limited utility of extant genetic testing).

